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JOHN F. HoRTy*
THE REASONING OF CHARITABLE IMMUNITY
The doctrine of charitable immunity first appeared in the
United States in McDonald v. Massachiusetts Gen. Hosp.1 In that
case it was held that a charitable hospital was not liable to a
patient for negligent treatment because the funds of a charity
could not be applied to pay such claims. However, the court
apparently recognized that the hospital could be held liable if the
surgeon had been negligently selected, although in a later Massa-
chusetts case 2 the court said that no hospital liability existed even
though the employee was selected negligently.
In the McDonald case, the Massachusetts court relied upon
the English case of Holliday v. Vestry of the Parish of St.
Leonard-' which did not involve the tort liability of a charitable
institution. The Holliday case in turn had relied upon language
in two previous English cases4 that stated no trust funds could
be diverted to pay damages. Neither of these cases involved the
tort liability of charitable institutions. Apparently the Massa-
chusetts court was unaware that before McDonald, two English
decisions ' overruled this line of authority.
Although in 1879 a Rhode Island court refused to apply the
doctrine of charitable immunity in a case involving a hospital,'
it was accepted by the Maryland court in Perry v. House of
Refuge 7 and has been adopted to some extent and for some dura-
tion by most American jurisdictions.
Charitable immunity it must be remembered, is a doctrine
applicable to all charities, including not only hospitals but churches,
schools and all charitable health and social agencies. While the
* Assoc. Professor of Law, School of Law; Director, Health Law Center, Uni-
versity of Pittsburgh.
1 120 Mass. 432 (1876).
2 Roosen v. Peter Bent Brigham Hosp., 235 Mass. 66, 126 N.E. 392 (1920).
3 11 C.B. (N.S.) 192, 142 Eng. Rep. 769 (C.P. 1861).
4 Heriot's Hosp. v. Ross, XII Clark & F., 507, 8 Eng. Rep. 1508 (H.L. 1846);
Duncan v. Findlater, VI Clark & F., 894, 7 Eng. Rep. 934 (H.L. 1839).
5 Mersey Docks & Harbour Bd. v. Gibbs, XI H.L. C. 686, 11 Eng. Rep. 1500
(H.L. 1866) ; Foreman v. Mayor of Canterbury, L.R1 6 Q.B. 214 (1871).
6 Glavin v. Rhode Island Hosp., 12 R.I. 411 (1879).
7 63 Md. 20 (1885).
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exact definition of a charity may vary slightly from state-to-state,
the concept basic to all definitions is the lack of private profit.
Many writers, especially in the hospital field, refer to a charitable
hospital as a "voluntary non-profit hospital," but the courts have
generally used the term "charitable hospital." It is also interesting
to note that as state after state has modified or abolished the
doctrine of charitable immunity, the critical decision has in each
instance involved a hospital.
As the various states in over 700 cases have examined the
question of charitable immunity, at least four different theories
have been used to explain and justify the doctrine. Theories are
often used in conjunction with each other and are often intermixed
in the court's reasoning.
The most traditional and enduring is the trust fund theory.
This reasoning considers that the funds of a charity constitute a
trust and that payment of tort claims would act as a diversion of
these funds from the charitable purposes for which they were
intended. This is the theory set forth in the McDonald case and
is the most prevalent theory in those states still recognizing the
doctrine. Underlying the trust fund theory is the idea that the
application of funds to satisfy tort claims would impair the use-
fulness of the charity by depleting the assets and that the loss of
the funds might make it difficult or impossible for it to carry out
its charitable function. It is also argued as additional justification
that donors to a charity do not intend that their gifts be used
to pay tort claims.
The theory has also been advanced that a beneficiary of the
charity, such as a hospital patient, assumes the risk of the charity's
negligence and by implication waives any right he may have to
recover from the hospital when he accepts benefits.' This reason-
ing emphasizes that the hospital confers a benefit upon the patient.
The weakness in this theory is that it does not take into considera-
tion modern medical prepayment plans and other facts of modem
medical care which remove much of the charity and beneficiary
nature of the hospital-patient relationship.
Another theory advanced to support charitable immunity is
that the doctrine of respondeat superior is not applicable to
charitable institutions.9 This theory reasons that the doctrine of
respondeat superior is based on the use of servants to make a
profit for their master. The law imposes liability on the master
for those acts of the servant which occur while he is engaged in
8 Powers v. Massachusetts Homeopathic Hosp., 109 Fed. 294 (1st Cir. 1901).
9 Hearns v. Waterbury Hosp., 66 Conn. 8, 33 AtI. 595 (1895).
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aiding the master in making a profit. Since a charitable hospital
does not seek to make a profit, so the reasoning goes, there is no
basis to impose liability upon the hospital under the doctrine of
respondeat superior.
A general public policy theory has also been used to justify
the immunity of charities.' 0 Courts using this theory generally
blend it with one of the reasons stated above but do not seek to
establish a rigid theory for the immunity doctrine. Public policy
is the theory used when the courts are unwilling to assert their
reliance upon one of the specific theories, perhaps because each
has inherent weaknesses.
Despite the theory used, however, and even under the most
extensive application of charitable immunity, the charitable insti-
tution is generally not held immune when the activity resulting
in the tortious injury was a commercial endeavor. Liability is
generally imposed when the activities are non-charitable, even
though the revenue was or would be devoted entirely to charitable
purposes. Thus, the significant initial question is whether the
activity which caused the injury is of a charitable or non-charitable
nature. At present, if the act is found to be non-charitable, no
jurisdiction grants immunity to the charitable institution. 1
Several states have either by statute or court decision made
recovery against the charity dependent upon the presence of non-
trust assets. Such assets are generally defined as property not
directly and exclusively utilized in the charity's work and includes
proceeds of liability insurance.'2 This doctrine has a conceptual
consistency with the trust fund theory of immunity, which rests
upon protecting the charity through protecting its trust assets.
However, it should be noted that using the funds of the charity
to purchase liability insurance is, in essence, a diversion of trust
assets from charitable use to make funds available to pay personal
injury claims. Also, this exception to the immunity doctrine has
one other inconsistency. The use of non-trust assets, such as
commercial property, to satisfy a judgment arising from a tort
action may lead to a loss of revenue to the charitable institution
which may adversely affect the performance of its charitable
functions and in fact cause an indirect depletion of the trust funds.
Thus, though the trust funds are held inviolate, the work of the
charity could suffer.
10 Jensen v. Maine Eye & Ear Infirmary, 107 Me. 408, 78 Atl. 898 (1910).
11 In Eads v. Y.W.C.A., 325 Mo. 577, 29 S.W2d 701 (1930) the court applied
the immunity rule when the activity was of a commercial nature. That decision was
later disapproved and perhaps stands as the high water mark of the immunity doctrine.
12 See Anderson v. Armstrong, 180 Tenn. 56, 171 S.W2d 401 (1943).
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Arkansas,13 Louisiana,14 and Maryland " have enacted "direct
action" statutes which permit suit by the injured party directly
against the insurers of charitable institutions and require that the
defense of the charitable nature of the insured may not be inter-
posed by the insurer. Colorado, 6 Illinois, 17 Tennessee, 8  and
Georgia 19 have, by decision, imposed liability on charitable hospitals
to the extent of their insurance coverage.
In some states the extent of immunity granted to a charitable
hospital is made dependent upon the relationship of the injured
person to the hospital. The general categories of persons considered
are employees, strangers, and beneficiaries. No state at present
considers strangers and employees differently in determining the
liability of a charitable institution. Thus the determining factor
in jurisdictions that reach different results because of the injured's
status appears to be whether the injured person is a beneficiary.
There is a tendency of the courts to grant charitable immunity
more readily when the injury is incurred by a beneficiary than
when the injured person is an employee or a stranger. Illustrative
is the decision in Koehler v. Ohio Valley Gen. Hosp. Ass'n.20 In
that case it was held that the charity was liable to a private patient
of a physician who rented space in the hospital to conduct his
private practice. This opinion stated that the physician's patient
was a stranger with respect to the hospital and the defense of
charitable immunity was not available. The opinion intimated that
if the injured person had been a hospital patient there would have
been no liability because a beneficiary would not have been entitled
to recover. Persons accompanying a discharged patient 2' have
generally been considered strangers. A private duty nurse, em-
ployed by the patient rather than the hospital, has also been con-
sidered to be a stranger.22
A distinction is occasionally made between patients that pay
for the services they receive and nonpaying patients. In juris-
13 Ark. Stat. Ann. § 66-3240 (Supp. 1963).
14 La. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 22:655 (Supp. 1963).
15 Md. Ann. Code art. 48A, § 85 (1957).
16 St. Lukes Hosp. Ass'n v. Long, 125 Colo. 25, 240 P.2d 917 (1952).
.7 Moore v. Moyle, 405 Ill. 555, 92 N.E.2d 81 (1950).
18 Vanderbilt Univ. v. Henderson, 23 Tenn. App. 135, 127 S.W2d 284 (1938).
19 Cox v. N. M. Dejarnette, 104 Ga. 664, 123 S.E.2d 16 (1961).
20 137 W. Va. 764, 73 S.E.2d 673 (1952).
21 Cohen v. General Hosp. Soc'y, 113 Conn. 188, 154 Ati. 435 (1931).
22 Rose v. Raleigh Fitkin-Paul Morgan Memorial Hosp., 136 N.J.L. 553, 57 A2d
29 (1948); note that the decision in Collopy v. Newark Eye & Ear Infirmary, 27
N.J. 29, 141 A.2d 276 (1958), eliminated charitable immunity in New Jersey, and
thus the Rose case is no longer law in New Jersey.
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dictions where such a distinction is recognized, the theory advanced
is that a paying patient is not a beneficiary of the charity and
thus should be able to recover for the hospital's negligence.23 Most
states that recognize charitable immunity do not distinguish be-
tween paying and nonpaying patients. The rationale of this position
is that payments made by patients for treatment are devoted to
the overall charitable work of the hospital and since no profit is
being made, no reason exists to permit the depletion of the assets
to pay personal injury claims. Whether the patient is a paying one
appears to have far less significance when the immunity rests on
the trust fund approach than when it rests upon the concept of
some kind of an implied waiver.
The extent to which charitable immunity may be applied may
also vary because of the nature of the negligence. Thus, a failure
to exercise due care in the selection and retention of employees
is a ground for imposing liability upon charitable hospitals other-
wise accorded immunity. Such a failure constitutes corporate
neglect. Thus, in St. Paul's Sanitarium v. Williamson 24 a Texas
court held that a charitable hospital was liable for negligence in
selecting its servants where a young girl, hired for running errands
and dishwashing, was permitted to place a hot water bottle in a
patient's bed. The patient was severely burned, and evidence
indicated that the girl had performed such tasks in the past. The
court held that the hospital had not met its duty to select only
competent persons to render care to patients and was liable for
corporate neglect, although no liability would have existed under
Texas law if a competent and experienced employee had placed
the hot water bottle in the patient's bed.
A failure to properly instruct an employee in the use of a
machine has been held to constitute corporate neglect for which
the charitable hospital would be held liable although it would other-
wise be immune.25 Corporate negligence also includes furnishing
non-suitable or defective equipment used in rendering hospital
care. In Medical and Surgical Memorial Hosp. v. Cawthorne2 0 it
was held that a charitable hospital providing an improvised heat
cradle was liable for an injury received by the patient. In Clampert
v. Sister of Charity 27 a failure to provide a bassinet for an infant
23 Wheat v. Idaho Falls Latter Day Saints Hosp., 297 P2d 1041 (Idaho Sup.
Ct. 1954).
24 164 S.W. 36 (Tex. Civ. App. 1914).
25 Hotel Dieu v. Armendarez, 210 S.W. 518 (Tex. Com. App. 1919).
26 229 S.W2d 932 (Tex. Civ. App. 1949).
27 17 Wash. 2d 652, 136 P.2d 729 (1943).
OHIO STATE LAW JOURNAL
patient and the use of a defective heating pad constituted corporate
neglect for which the hospital was held liable.
It should be noted that several states have considered the
distinction between imposing the liability for corporate negligence
and imposing liability for negligence of employees and have re-
jected it, holding that charitable immunity exists in both instances.
Also, a Pennsylvania decision 28 denied the imposition of liability
upon a charitable institution for negligence consisting of failure
to keep the sidewalk in good repair, a duty imposed by statute
and ordinance.
A HISTORY OF CHARITABLE IMMUNITY IN OHIO
The first Ohio case in which the doctrine of charitable immunity
was applied was Taylor v. Protestant Hosp. Ass'n1, 29 decided in 1911.
The plaintiff, as administrator of his deceased wife's estate, brought
an action alleging that a nurse employed by the defendant hospital
had negligently miscounted the gauze sponges used in surgery on
his wife. The plaintiff contended that, as a result of the miscount,
a sponge had been left in the decedent's body, causing her death.
The hospital's defense was that because of its organization as a
public and charitable corporation, it was exempt from liability
for the negligence of the nurse-employee. The trial court over-
ruled a general demurrer to this defense, and the plaintiff appealed.
On appeal, the plaintiff took the position that the doctrine of
respondeat superior was applicable, notwithstanding the charitable
nature of the corporation, and that since the decedent was a paying
patient, a special contractual relationship existed which imposed
an obligation on the defendant different from that created when
a nonpaying patient was admitted.
The Supreme Court of Ohio refused to distinguish between
patients who were able to pay for services and those who were not.
The court adopted the view that the hospital corporation did not
become any the less a charity by receiving funds from those able
to pay, since all hospital funds were devoted to a charitable purpose.
However, the court did acknowledge a possible contractual duty
on the part of the hospital to use due and reasonable care in the
selection of employees. This, however, was not presented as an
issue in the appeal.
While the court in the Taylor case recognized that the doctrine
of respondeat superior was designed to meet the ends of justice, it
28 Bond v. City of Pittsburgh, 368 Pa. 404, 84 A2d 329 (1951).
29 85 Ohio St. 90, 96 N.E. 1089 (1911).
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concluded that to apply it to a charitable organization would not
be justified:
Doubtless the rule will be extended to meet the requirements of
manifold new conditions brought about by growth and advance.
Courts are constantly confronted with the necessity of extending
established principles to new conditions. But in this case it is
sought to extend the rule to masters different from others, and
who do not come within its reason, and to hold a public charity
involving no private profit responsible for the negligence of serv-
ants employed solely for a public use and a public benefit. We
think such an extension is not justified. Public policy should
and does encourage enterprises with the aims and purposes of
defendant, and requires that they should be exempted from the
operation of the rule.30
In essence, then, it was decided that the public policy in favor of
charitable organizations was controlling, notwithstanding the recog-
nized public purpose served by an application of the respondeat
superior doctrine.
In 1922, the Taylor v. Flower Deaconess Home and Hosp.3 '
case directly dealt with the issue of whether charitable organizations
in Ohio enjoyed total immunity, or whether certain exceptions to
the general rule of the first Taylor 3 2 case would be recognized. The
plaintiff predicated his right to recovery on the negligence of the
defendant hospital in its failure to exercise ordinary care in the
selection and retention of a nurse who administered an injection
of scalding hot water to the plaintiff following surgery, causing
serious bums. The hospital, relying upon the 1911 Taylor case,
presented the defense of charitable immunity. As noted, the
supreme court in the earlier Taylor case had in passing suggested
that liability would be imposed if the charity had been negligent
in selecting its employees. In this case, the question was squarely
at issue. After reviewing authorities from other jurisdictions, the
supreme court stated:
• . . the exemption from liability of such organizations, subject
to the condition of care in the selection and the retention of
servants, which condition is so frequently found in the decisions
of courts on the subject, indicates the general judgment that the
exemption from the operations of the rule respondeat superior,
which experience has shown to be a valuable aid in securing the
ends of justice, should not be sweeping and complete, but should
be surrounded by such safeguards as will prevent the neglect
of a duty which the hospital can and should perform.33
30 Id. at 92, 96 N.E. at 1092.
31 104 Ohio St. 61, 135 N.E. 287 (1922).
32 See note 1 supra.
33 104 Ohio St. 61, 73, 135 N.E. 287, 291.
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The court also stated that although the donors of funds to charities
do not contemplate diversion of such funds for the payment of
damages for the negligent acts of servants, they realize that justice
requires care in the selection of employees as well as the mainte-
nance of property. Accordingly, the hospital was held liable to the
plaintiff for his injuries. The first exception to Ohio's charitable
immunity rule was established.
A second exception soon followed. In 1930, the supreme court
decided Sisters of Charity of Cincinnati v. Duvelius.4 In the D-
velius case, -the plaintiff was a registered special duty nurse, not
employed by the hospital, who was in the hospital nursing a
patient with the consent of the hospital. The plaintiff asserted
that she sustained injuries because of the alleged negligence of a
hospital employee operating the hospital's passenger elevator. She
further contended that the employee was incompetent and unfit,
and that the hospital management knew or should have known
of the employee's lack of qualifications. The court acknowl-
edged that while immunity was the result of considerations of
public policy when the injured party was a direct beneficiary
of a charity, such as a patient, other considerations of public
policy were equally important; namely, that an innocent third
person should not be required to bear the costs of another's
negligence. The court reasoned that whatever theory of immunity
was applied to justify barring a suit by a patient, it did not follow
that a stranger should likewise be barred. It stated that the duty
to exercise care to prevent injuries to strangers would result in
greater care to patients, and conversely, any encouragement to
negligence towards strangers would inevitably be reflected in lack
of care to patients. The court held, therefore, that charitable insti-
tutions would be treated the same as other corporations as to
liability for negligence to strangers and invitees who were lawfully
upon the premises.
In Wadell v. Y.W.C.A., 5 a case which was later to prove
significant to the continuation of the Ohio rule of limited immunity,
the rule of charitable immunity was first applied to an institution
other than a hospital. The Wadell case involved the alleged negli-
gence of a swimming instructor, employed by the Y.W.C.A., which
resulted in an injury to the minor plaintiff. The plaintiff appealed
from a judgment non obstante veredicto, contending that the
defendant failed to exercise due care in its selection of the instructor
and that the burden of proof on this issue was on the defendant.
84 123 Ohio St. 52, 173 N.E. 737 (1930).
35 133 Ohio St. 601, 15 N.E2d 140 (1938).
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In its affirming opinion, the court stated that the Ohio chari-
table immunity rule pertained not only to hospitals, but to all public
charitable institutions. This case also affirmed the position taken
in an earlier Ohio case, 6 that the burden of establishing lack of
due care in the selection of an employee was upon the plaintiff.
However, the primary and continuing importance of this case was
that no distinction was drawn between hospitals and other chari-
table institutions for the purpose of applying the immunity rule.
3 7
Much later, in 1956, forty-five years after charitable immunity
was established in Ohio, and at a time when many other states
had begun to question the immunity doctrine, the Supreme Court
of Ohio re-examined the policy reasons behind the doctrine in
Avellone v. St. Johl's Hosp.,38 and decided that a defense based on
immunity would henceforth be rejected. In the Avellone case, a
former patient brought an action against the hospital alleging that
he was negligently permitted to fall from a bed on two different
occasions. The hospital demurred to this pleading, raising the
defense of immunity. The demurrer case was sustained and appealed
to the Ohio Supreme Court. The supreme court stated that al-
though its previous decisions often referred to the various theories
for the justification of immunity, its sole basis was that of public
policy. The opinion concluded that whatever policy reasons justi-
fied a different rule for charities when the first Taylor case 39 was
decided, such reasons were no longer controlling. Several reasons
were given for this conclusion: the social consciousness of the present
day government; the prevalence of hospitalization insurance, which
provides more funds for hospital operation; the availability of li-
ability insurance; and the fact that hospitals themselves had
changed. The court stated:
It is also noted that the average nonprofit hospital of today is a
large well run corporation, and, in many instances, the hospital
is so "businesslike" in its monetary requirements for entrance
and in its collections of accounts that a shadow is thrown upon
the word, "charity," and the base of payment mentioned above is
broadened still more.40
30 Lakeside Hosp. v. Kovar, 131 Ohio St. 333, 2 N.E.2d 857 (1936).
37 See also Cullen v. Schmit, 139 Ohio St. 194, 39 N.E.2d 146 (1942), where
the doctrine was applied in a case involving a church as the defendant, and Newman
v. Cleveland Museum of Natural History, 143 Ohio St. 369, 55 N.E.2d 575 (1944),
where the defendant was a public museum.
38 165 Ohio St. 467, 135 N.E,2d 410 (1956).
39 See note 1 supra.
40 165 Ohio St. 467, 474, 135 N.E.2d 410, 415.
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In summary, the court believed that the immunity rule was out
of step with present day conditions.
The dissenting opinion in the Avellone decision commented
that the decision abolished the immunity of numerous other chari-
table organizations in Ohio, stating that the decision could not
logically be circumscribed to be applicable to hospitals alone. This
concern, however, was to be allayed by later decisions.41 The
dissent also contended that such a sweeping change in policy and
law was within the province of the legislature and not the courts.
The first decision involving immunity to follow Avellone was
Gibbon v. Y.W.C.A. of Hamiltor.42 The Gibbon case was an action
based upon the alleged negligence of employees of the Y.W.C.A.
which resulted in the drowning of an individual using the Y.W.C.A.'s
pool. The court of appeals held that Avellone was controlling,
since there was no legal distinction between a hospital corporation
and the defendant corporation.
On appeal, 43 the supreme court was presented the issue of
whether the Avellone decision applied to all charitable institutions
in Ohio or only to charitable hospital corporations. The court, after
noting the various reasons for a change of policy given in Avellone,
declined to apply the Avellone ruling to all charitable organizations.
It said:
Similarly compelling reasons are not established to the satisfaction
of the majority in this case, particularly in light of the recent
legislative developments recited herein showing the conflict of
views in the area of charitable immunity or liability. Therefore,
we decline to again declare an extension or modification of public
policy. We feel that under these circumstances the doctrine of
stare decisis should be applied and followed in order, if for no
other reason, to avoid retroactive imposition of liability on a
charitable institution which would result from the declaration of
a different public policy-and we hold accordingly. Any legis-
lative enactment declaring a different policy could only be pro-
spective in its operation.44
It is interesting -to note that the question of retroactive liability
was not considered in the Avellone decision.
At the present time, therefore, the Ohio law relating to chari-
table immunity can be stated as follows: a charitable institution
other than a charitable hospital corporation is, as a matter of
public policy, not liable for tortious injury except (1) when the
41 See Gibbon v. Y.W.C.A. of Hamilton, 170 Ohio St. 280, 164 N.E2d 563 (1960).
42 159 N.E.2d 911 (Ohio Ct. App. 1959).
43 Gibbon v. Y.W.C.A. of Hamilton, supra note 41.
44 Gibbon v. Y.W.C.A. of Hamilton, supra note 41, at 288, 164 N.E2d at 572.
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injured person is not a beneficiary of the institution, and (2) when
a beneficiary suffers harm as a result of a failure of the institution
to exercise due care in the selection or retention of an employee.
CHARITABLE IMMUNITY IN OTHER STATES
Elsewhere charitable immunity has a speckled past and an
uncertain future. What follows is a breakdown of the current
status of the doctrine in each state with special emphasis on
hospitals. The cases cited represent the most recent ones only
when such case has changed the doctrine itself.
ALABAMA: Charitable hospitals have no immunity, although
the courts have not foreclosed the possibility that a charitable
hospital could be immune in an action by a non-paying patient.
Tucker v. Mobile Infirmary Ass'n, 191 Ala. 572, 68 So. 4 (1915),
Alabama Baptist Bd. v. Carter, 226 Ala. 109, 145 So. 443, (1932).
ALASKA: Charitable hospitals have no immunity. Moats v.
Sisters of Charity of Providence, 13 Alaska 546 (1952).
ARIZONA: Charitable hospitals have no immunity. Ray v.
Tucson Medical Center, 72 Ariz. 22, 230 P.2d 220 (1952).
ARKANSAS: The property of charitable institutions cannot
be reached by execution on a judgment in an action arising out
of negligence of their employees. Fordyce & McKee v. Women's
Christian Nat'l Library Ass'n, 79 Ark. 550, 96 S.W. 155 (1906).
However, a statute, Ark. Stat. Ann. § 66-3240, permits suit
against an insurance carrier directly when the charitable organi-
zation has liability insurance, and liability is not limited by the
terms of the policy. In Ramsey v. American Auto. Ins. Co., 356
S.W.2d 236 (1962) the employee of a charitable institution would
have been able to recover against the insurance company except
for a specific policy provision excluding employees.
CALIFORNIA: Charitable hospitals have no immunity.
Malloy v. Fong, 37 Cal. 2d 356, 232 P.2d 241 (1951).
COLORADO: Although a charitable hospital has no immunity,
no execution may be had under a judgment upon any property or
funds of such hospitals which are dedicated to a charitable purpose.
St. Lukes Hosp. Ass'n v. Long, 125 Colo. 25, 240 P.2d 917 (1952).
The effect of this doctrine is that the presence of insurance or assets
not devoted to charitable use determines the ability of an injured
party to recover.
CONNECTICUT: Charitable hospitals are liable to strangers
of the charity for negligence, and it is likely that the same rule
would be applied if an employee of the hospital were the party
injured. Cohen v. General Hosp. Socy, 113 Conn. 188, 154 Atl. 435
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(1931). Immunity exists for charitable hospitals in actions brought
by patients, unless corporate neglect, such as negligence in the
selection or retention of employees is shown. Cashman v. Meriden
Hosp., 117 Conn. 585, 169 Atl. 915 (1933).
DELAWARE: Charitable hospitals have no immunity. Dur-
ney v. St. Francis Hosp., 46 Del. 350, 83 A.2d 753 (1951).
DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA: Charitable hospitals have been
held liable for negligence in a suit by a non-patient. President &-
Directors of Georgetown College v. Hughes, 130 F.2d 810 (D.C.
Cir. 1942). However, a charitable hospital is not liable to a patient
in the absence of corporate negligence, such as negligence in the
selection and retention of employees. White v. Providence Hosp.,
80 F. Supp. 76 (D.D.C. 1949).
FLORIDA: Charitable hospitals have no immunity. Nichol-
son v. Good Samaritan Hosp., 145 Fla. 360, 199 So. 344 (1940).
GEORGIA: Charitable hospitals have no immunity in a suit
by a paying patient; although execution is limited to the funds
derived from paying patients. Morton v. Savannah Hosp., 148 Ga.
438, 96 S.E. 887 (1918); Executive Comm. of the Baptist Conven-
tion v. Ferguson, 95 Ga. App. 393, 98 S.E.2d 50 (1957). However,
charitable hospitals would not appear to be liable except for negli-
gence in the selection or retention of the employees where the
injury is to an employee, stranger or a charity patient. Morton v.
Savannah Hosp., 148 Ga. 438, 96 S.E. 887 (1918); Burgess v. James,
73 Ga. App. 857, 38 S.E.2d 637 (1946). It does appear that no
immunity is accorded a charitable hospital to the extent that it is
covered by a liability insurance policy. Cox v. DeJarnetts, 104 Ga.
664, 123 S.E.2d 16 (1961).
HAWAII: No cases have considered the question of charitable
immunity.
IDAHO: A charitable hospital is liable to paying patients for
injuries caused by the negligence of the hospital's employees,
Wheat v. Idaho Falls Latter Day Saints Hosp., 297 P.2d 1041
(Idaho Sup. Ct. 1956).
ILLINOIS: Although there is no immunity of the hospital
from suit, trust fund assets are immune from execution on judg-
ment. Moore v. Moyle, 405 Ill. 555, 92 N.E.2d 81 (1950). Thus,
existence of liability insurance permits recovery under a judgment.
INDIANA: A hospital is immune from liability for injury
to a paying patient unless the hospital was negligent in the selec-
tion or retention of the employee. St. Vincent's Hosp. v. Stine,
195 Ind. 350, 144 N.E. 537 (1924). However, a charity has been
held liable to strangers for negligence and a similar result is likely
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if the person injured was an employee. Winona Technical Institute
v. Stolte, 173 Ind. 39, 89 N.E. 393 (1909).
IOWA: Charitable hospitals have no immunity. Haynes v.
Presbyterian Hosp. Ass'n of Iowa, 241 Iowa 1269, 45 N.W.2d 151
(1950).
KANSAS: A statute, Kan. Gen. Stat. Ann. § 17-1725, restored
charitable immunity which had been ended by the decision in
Noel v. Menninger Foundation, 175 Kan. 751, 267 P.2d 934 (1954).
It appears from the wording of the statute, however, that liability
would exist to the extent that insurance is present.
KENTUCKY: Charitable hospitals have no immunity. Mul-
likin v. Jewish Hosp. Ass'n of Louisville, 348 S.W.2d 930 (Ky. Ct.
App. 1961).
LOUISIANA: A charitable hospital is not liable to a paying
patient except for negligence in the selection or retention of
employees. Jordan v. Touro Infirmary, 123 So. 726 (La. App.
1922). However, a charity has been held liable where the injured
party was a stranger or an employee. Bougon v. Volunteers of Am.,
151 So. 797 (La. App. 1934); Lusk v. United States Fid. & Guar.
Co., 199 So. 666 (La. App. 1941). A Louisiana statute, La. Rev.
Stat. Ann. § 22:655 (1950), authorizes bringing an action directly
against the insurer and it has been held that the insurer may not
raise the defense of charitable immunity if the insured is a charitable
institution. Stamos v. Standard Acc. Ins. Co., 119 F. Supp. 245
(W.D. La. 1954).
MAINE: A charitable hospital is not liable to a patient for
negligence on the part of its employees. Jensen v. Maine Eye and
Ear Infirmary, 107 Me. 408, 78 Atl. 898 (1910). No cases have
determined liability towards employees or strangers.
MARYLAND: Charitable hospitals are immune in Maryland.
Perry v. House of Refuge, 63 Md. 20 (1885). However, a statute,
Md. Code Ann. article 48A, § 85 (1957), provides that liability
insurance policies issued to charitable institutions must contain a
provision estopping the insurer from asserting charitable immunity
as a defense.
MASSACHUSETTS: Charitable hospitals are immune from
liability for negligence. McDonald v. Massachusetts Gen. Hosp.,
120 Mass. 432 (1876). However, liability has been imposed upon
the charity where the negligence occurred in the operation of a
commercial enterprise. McKay v. Morgan Memorial Co-op Indus.
and Stores, 272 Mass. 121, 172 N.E. 68 (1930).
MICHIGAN: Charitable hospitals have no immunity. Parker
v. Port Huron Hosp., 361 Mich. 1, 105 N.W.2d 1 (1960).
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MINNESOTA: Charitable hospitals have no immunity. MU-
liner v. Evangelischer Diakoniessenverein, 144 Minn. 392, 175 N.W.
699 (1920).
MISSISSIPPI: Charitable hospitals are liable to paying
patients, employees, or strangers for the negligence of employees.
Mississippi Baptist Hosp. v. Holmes, 214 Miss. 906, 55 So. 2d 142
(1951). Although the Holmes case did not overrule Mississippi
Baptist Hosp. v. Moore, 156 Miss. 676, 126 So. 465 (1930), which
stated that a charitable hospital is not liable for a non-paying
patient except for negligence in selection or retention of an em-
ployee, the reasoning of the Holmes case is likely the basis for
repudiating charitable immunity in Mississippi.
MISSOURI: Hospitals are immune from liability for negli-
gence of their employees. Dille v. St. Luke's Hosp., 355 Mo. 436,
196 S.W.2d 615 (1946). However, a hospital can be held liable
when the injury occurs in the conduct of a commercial activity.
Blatt v. George H. Nettleton Home for Aged Women, 275 S.W.2d
344 (Mo. Sup. Ct. 1955).
MONTANA: No decision in the Montana courts has dealt
directly with the issue of charitable immunity. A federal court in
Montana has ruled that a charitable hospital is not immune from
liability for the negligence of its employees. Howard v. Sisters of
Charity of Leavenworth, 193 F. Supp. 191 (D.C. Mont. 1961).
NEBRASKA: Hospitals are immune from liability for negli-
gence of employees in actions brought by a paying patient. Duncan
v. Nebraska Sanitarium Benevolent Ass'n, 92 Neb. 162, 137 N.W.
1120 (1912). However liability has been imposed where the injured
party was a stranger. Marble v. Nicholas Senn Hosp. Ass'n, 102
Neb. 343, 167 N.W. 208 (1918).
NEVADA: A charitable institution is not liable to beneficiaries
for negligence. Springer v. Federated Church of Reno, 71 Nev. 177,
283 P.2d 1071 (1955). Although no decisions have involved chari-
table hospitals, there would apparently be immunity in an action
by a non-paying patient. The Springer case indicates that liability
would exist in an action brought by either a paying patient or a
stranger.
NEW HAMPSHIRE: There is no recognition of charitable
immunity in New Hampshire. Welch v. Frisbie Memorial Hosp.,
90 N.H. 337, 9 A.2d 761 (1939).
NEW JERSEY: After the decision in Collopy v. Newark Eye
and Ear Infirmary, 27 N.J. 29, 141 A.2d 276 (1958) terminated
charitable immunity, the legislature passed N.J. Stat. Ann. tit. 2A,§§ 53A-7 to -11. Under this statute liability to patients of a chari-
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table hospital is limited to 10,000 dollars. There is no limitation to
liability with respect to injuries to strangers and employees.
NEW MEXICO: No decisions of the New Mexico courts
deal with charitable immunity. A federal court, sitting in New
Mexico, held charitable hospitals immune where there was no
negligence in the selection or retention of employees. Deming
Ladies' Hosp. Ass'n v. Price, 276 Fed. 668 (8th Cir. 1921).
NEW YORK: Charitable hospitals have no immunity. Bing
v. Thunig, 2 N.Y.2d 656, 143 N.E.2d 2, 163 N.Y.S.2d 3 (1957).
NORTH CAROLINA: Hospitals are immune from liability to
patients except for injury resulting from negligent selection or
retention of employees. Hoke v. Glen, 167 N.C. 594, 83 S.E. 807
(1914). However, liability has been imposed when the injury is
to an employee and it is likely that the same results would occur
if the injured party were a stranger. Cowans v. North Carolina
Baptist Hosp., 197 N.C. 41, 147 S.E. 672 (1929).
NORTH DAKOTA: Charitable immunity has not been recog-
nized in North Dakota. Rickbeil v. Grafton Deaconess Hosp.,
74 N.D. 525, 23 N.W.2d 247 (1946).
OHIO: The Ohio law is exhaustively covered previously in
this article.
OKLAHOMA: Charitable immunity is not recognized in an
action brought by an employee or a paying patient. Gable v.
Salvation Army, 186 Okla. 687, 100 P.2d 244 (1940); Sisters of
Sorrowful Mother v. Zeidler, 183 Okla. 454, 82 P.2d 996 (1938).
OREGON: Charitable hospitals have no immunity in Oregon.
H'ungerford v. Portland Sanitarium and Benevolent Ass'n, 384 P.2d
1009 (1963).
PENNSYLVANIA: Charitable institutions are immune from
liability for negligence. Knecht v. St. Mary's Hosp., 392 Pa. 75,
140 A.2d 30 (1958). Charitable immunity is not applicable when
the injury is caused in the operation of a commercial enterprise.
Siidekum v. Animal Rescue League, 353 Pa. 408, 45 A.2d 59 (1946).
RHODE ISLAND: By statute, Rhode Island grants im-
munity to charitable hospitals in actions by patients. R.I. Gen.
Laws Ann. § 7-1-22 (1956). Prior to the enactment of the statute
it had been held that no immunity existed. Thus, except in the
case of a hospital patient, where immunity exists by virtue of the
statute, no immunity is recognized.
SOUTH CAROLINA: Charitable hospitals are immune from
liability from negligence. Lindler v. Columbia Hosp. of Richmond
County, 98 S.C. 25, 81 S.E. 512 (1914). Immunity is not recog-
nized if the injury occurs in conducting a commercial activity.
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Eiserhardt v. State Agricultural & Mechanical Soc'y, 235 S.C. 305,
111 S.E.2d 568 (1959).
SOUTH DAKOTA: No cases have considered the question
of charitable immunity.
TENNESSEE: Charitable hospitals have no immunity. How-
ever, execution under a judgment can only reach property which
is not directly and exclusively devoted to charitable purposes.
McLeod v. St. Thomas Hosp., 170 Tenn. 423, 95 S.W.2d 917 (1936).
TEXAS: A charitable hospital is not liable to a patient or
stranger for negligence unless there has been negligence in the em-
ployee's selection or retention. Baptist Memorial Hosp. v. McTighe,
303 S.W.2d 446 (Tex. Civ. App. 1957). Liability has been imposed
upon a charity for negligent injury to an employee, although the
rule appears limited by the facts of the case to instances where
corporate negligence is shown. Hotel Dieu v. Armendarez, 210 S.W.
518 (Tex. Com. App. 1919). But see Felan v. Lucey, 259 S.W.2d
302 (Tex. Civ. App. 1953) which does not appear to recognize any
immunity where the injured person is an employee. However, a
charitable hospital is liable to a patient for corporate negligence
consisting of furnishing unsafe appliances. Medical and Surgical
Memorial Hosp. v. Cawthorn, 229 S.W.2d 932 (Tex. Civ. App.
1949).
UTAH: Charitable hospitals have no immunity. Sessions v.
Thomas D. Dee Memorial Hosp. Ass'n, 94 Utah 460, 78 P.2d 645
(1938).
VERMONT: Charitable hospitals have no immunity. Foster
v. Roman Catholics Diocese of Vermont, 116 Vt. 124, 70 A.2d 230
(1950).
VIRGINIA: Charitable hospitals are liable to patients for
negligence in the selection or retention of employees. Norfolk
Protestant Hosp. v. Plunkett, 162 Va. 151, 173 SE. 363 (1934).
No immunity is recognized where the injured person is a stranger,
and it is likely that the same result would be reached where an
employee was injured. Hospital of St. Vincent of Paul v. Thompson,
116 Va. 101, 81 S.E. 13 (1914).
WASHINGTON: A charitable hospital is apparently immune
from suit for liability for negligence in actions brought by non-
paying patients. Lyon v. Tumwater Evangelical Free Church,
47 Wash. 2d 202, 287 P.2d 128 (1955). However, a charitable
hospital is liable to such patients for injury resulting from corporate
negligence, such as negligence in the selection or retention of
employees. Richardson v. Carbon Hill Coal Co., 6 Wash. 52, 32 Pac.
1012 (1893), or for the failure to furnish suitable equipment. Miller
v. Sisters of St. Francis, 5 Wash. 2d 204, 105 P.2d 32 (1940). A
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charitable hospital is liable to a paying patient for negligence.
Pierce v. Yakima Valley Memorial Hosp. Ass'n, 43 Wash. 2d 162,
260 P.2d 765 (1953). But no immunity exists where the injured
party is a stranger, Heckman v. Sisters of Charity, 5 Wash. 2d 699,
106 P.2d 593 (1940).
WEST VIRGINIA: Charitable hospitals are immune from
liability to patients except for negligence in the selection or reten-
tion of employees. Roberts v. Ohio Valley Gen. Hosp., 98 W.Va.
476, 127 S.E. 318 (1925). No immunity is recognized where the
injured person is a stranger and probably none where the injured
person is an employee. Koehler v. Ohio Valley Gen. Hosp. Ass'n,
137 W.Va. 764, 73 S.E.2d 673 (1952).
WISCONSIN: Charitable hospitals have no immunity. Kojis
v. Doctors Hosp., 12 Wis. 2d 367, 107 N.W.2d 131, supplemental
opinion at 292 (1961).
WYOMING: A charitable hospital is immune from liability
to patients unless negligence is shown in the selection or retention
of the employee. Bishop Randall Hosp. v. Hartley, 24 Wyo. 408,
160 Pac. 385 (1916). No cases discuss whether immunity is recog-
nized in actions by strangers or employees.
PUERTO RICO: No immunity of charitable institutions is
recognized. Tavarez v. San Juan Lodge, 68 P.R.R. 681 (1948).
